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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS-VALIDITY
OF FRAZIER-LEMKE
AMENDMENT TO BANKRUPTCY ACT-The Frazier-Lemke Amendment to the

Bankruptcy Act' provides that a farmer unable to achieve a composition with
creditors under preceding sections 2 may ask to be adjudged bankrupt. If all
secured creditors consent, he may then retain possession and redeem the property by paying an appraised value and interest thereon in installments over a sixyear period. Should a secured creditor object, the bankrupt may retain possession for five years, meanwhile paying a reasonable rental. Thereafter he may
redeem the property at the appraised price and be discharged., A Maryland
farmer petitioned federal court to stay mortgage foreclosure proceedings in state
court, preliminary to seeking the amendment's relief. Held, that the amendment was unconstitutional, as violating the "due process" clause of the Fifth
Amendment; petition denied.

In re Bradford, 7 F. Supp. 665 (D. Md. 1934).4

Whether a stay of dispossession of defaulting farmer-debtors, coupled with
designation of a period for redemption at an appraised price, falls within Congress' bankruptcy power can not be categorically asserted. The instant court
found that it did, only to apply straightway the quietus of "due process". Its
first conclusion is supported by critical surmise ' and by generous definitions of
bankruptcy jurisdiction.0 As to how far the bankruptcy authority is subject to
the "due process" clause, definitive authority is again lacking. Other delegated
powers, however, are restricted by it only if arbitrarily and unreasonably exercised. 7 And since a state's use of its reserved police power to limit contract
rights is governed no more harshly by the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,8 it would seem that Congress should have equal latitude in
I. P. L. No. 486, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
47 STAT. 1470, II U. S. C. A. § 203 (a-r) (Supp. 1933), as amended by P. L. No.
296, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (0934) §§ 6, 8, 9.
3. See generally on the Frazier-Lemke Act: More Bankruptcy Legislation (z934) io
A. B. REv. 361; Frazier-LeinkeFarm Bankruptcy Act Assailed As Unconstitutional (1934)
ii A. B. REv. 42; Krauthoff, The Frazier-Lemke Act (1934) 39 Cois. L. J. 586; Hanna,
The Frazier-Lemke Amendments to Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 20 A. B.
A. 3. 687.
4. Since it was presupposed by counsel for both debtor and mortgagee that the latter
would object to the six-year installment paying provision, the opinion was primarily devoted to the fie-year rental alternative.
5.Spaeth, The Reorganization Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 8 TEMPLE
L. Q. 447, 449; Hanna, supra note 3, at 689. Professor Hanna also considers the act to be
violative of "due process".
6. The broadest interpretations extend the power to comprise all instances of nonpaying debtors. See In re Reiman, Fed. Cas. No. 11,673, at 496 (S. D. N. Y. 1874);
Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill 317, 321 (N. Y. 1843); 2 STORY, CoMMETrARMs ON TEE CONsTrruTIoN (5th ed. 1891) 54, n. 3. Cf. it re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 9"29 (C. C. A. 7th,
1934). By other definitions it is applicable to cases in which proceeds of a debtor's property
are distributed among creditors. See Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181,
186, 188 (192) ; In re Klein, Fed. Cas. No. 7,865, at 718 (C. C. D. Mo. 1843), reported
also in note in I How. (U. S.1843) 277, 281; 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d
ed. I929) § 638. See also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 195 (U. S. 18ig).
7. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 240 U. S.1,24 (1916) (taxing); cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (I893) (commerce) ; Nichols v.
Coolidge, 274 U. S.531 (1927) (taxing); Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 284 U. S. 8o (i93i) (commerce) ; Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S.312 (1932) (taxing).
The restriction has, at least as to taxation, been applied sparingly. See Stone, J., dissenting
in Heiner v. Donnan, supra, at 338.
8. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S.502 (I934), as to which see Note (1934) 82 U. oF
PA. L. Rmv. 619. The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Roberts, contains the following trenchant sentence: "And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held,
2.
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exercising a delegated power. The Supreme Court has already sanctioned Congress' use of its police power over the District of Columbia to effect a two-year
stay of tenant dispossession.9 Other similar moratory legislation, however, has
come from the states and consequently has run afoul not only of "due process",
but also of the more stringent '- prohibition against impairing the obligation of
contracts. Nevertheless, states may establish debt moratoria in emergencies,
provided creditors' rights are reasonably safeguarded.", The reasonableness of
the amendment becomes then the ultimate criterion. That it goes beyond any
legislation hitherto sustained must be conceded. Not only is satisfaction of creditors' claims deferred, but the quantum of their rights may be drastically reduced. Most bankruptcy laws have such effect, but usually at greater sacrifice
to the debtor, who surrenders the privileges of possession and redemption. On
the other hand, exemptions for bankrupts are permissible; 12 and the retained

privileges may be regarded as such. Another objection is the statute's comparatively lengthy operation period,' 3 which seriously prejudices creditors. Since
its effects may conceivably outlast the emergency,' 4 use of the "emergency doctrine" is also weakened thereby. But in view of the rental, interest, and reappraisal :' features of the act, as well as of the critical situation 21it is designed
to meet, it is 7possible that the Supreme Court will not find the difficulties overly
embarassing.1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMIENT AcT-The Agri-

PROCESSING TAX

demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained."
At 525.
9. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1921).
1o. See Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria
(1933) I U. oF CHI. L. REv. 249, 25I (1933). Not only is the contracts clause more explicit
in its terminology, but the very purpose of its insertion was to prevent moratory legislation
in emergencies. See Mr. Justice Sutherland dissenting in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 465 (1934). The clause has operated to prevent states from discharging existing contracts by insolvency laws. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. I22
(U. S. I819). Congress, of course, has never labored under such a disability in the use of
its bankruptcy power.
n. The "safe-guard" test has been stated most fully in Home Building & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), as to which see Corwin, Moratorium Over Minnesota
(1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 311. Moratory legislation has been sustained also in Marcus
Brown Holding Co., Inc. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 17o (ig2i);
Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co.,
Inc. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242 (I922). It has been denied validity in Bronson v. Kinzie, i
How. 311 (U. S. 1843) ; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 6o8 (U. S. 1844). See generally,
Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HAmv. L. REv. io6i; Bunn,
supra note 30.
12. In re Reiman, Fed. Cas. No. 11,675 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875) ; cf. Hanover National
Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 (igo).
13. In the cases cited in notes 9 and ii supra as upholding moratoria, the statutes were
limited in duration to approximately two years.
14. There may be a five-year stay of dispossession; and a petition for such a stay is
entertainable at any time within five years after March 3, 1933. 47 STAT. 1471, 11 U. S.
C. A. §2o3 (c) (Supp. 1933).
15. At the end of the five-year period, or earlier, the holder of a lien on real estate
may cause a reappraisal, and then choose which appraisal shall be met by the debtor.
16. Rioting in at least five states has necessitated postponement of judicial sales of
foreclosed farm property. See Feller, supra note n, at lo73, n. 84.
17. A court hostile to the amendment by its own admission has nevertheless felt compelled to find it not unreasonable in upholding its constitutionality. In re Radford (W. D.
Ky. 1934), U. S. L. Week, Nov. 2o, 1934, at 7. The instant case has been followed in an
opinion rendered orally in the case of In re Conquest (E. D. Va. 1934) ; see U. S. L. Week,
Nov. 2o, 1934, at 1, 14.
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cultural Adjustment Act" declared the existence of a national emergency produced in part by the decline of agricultural prices. It provided for benefit lpayments to farmers to induce them to curtail production. In order to meet these
benefit payments and administrative expenses it further provided for a tax on
the processing of certain agricultural commodities. The receivers of an insolvent
corporation presented to the court a report on a tax claim assessed pursuant to
this Act. They recommended that the claim be disallowed on the ground that the
tax was invalid as an attempt to regulate by taxation agricultural prices and production, a matter not within the delegated powers of Congress. Held, that the
tax was valid and that the claim should be allowed. Franklin Process Co. v.
Hoosac Mills Corp., 8 F. Supp. 552 (D. Mass. 1934).
The principal objection 2 raised to the validity of the processing tax calls
into question a much-mooted subject: the nature and extent of the federal taxing
power. In the case of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.3 it was established that
the taxing power could not be used as a weapon to regulate matters not within
the delegated powers of Congress. In such a case, the Supreme Court has held
that the imposition would not be a tax, but a penalty to induce compliance with
Congress's wishes. The court in the instant case was clearly justified in holding
that the processing tax did not come under the rule in the Bailey case in that the
purpose of the measure is not the regulation of the business taxed (the sine qua
non of a penalty under Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), but rather the raising
of revenue. As a taxing measure it is, however, subject to the limitation that it
must be laid for a public purpose: the so-called "public purpose" doctrine established by Loan Association v. Topeka.4 The recent tendency 5 of the Supreme
Court to extend the definition of "businesses affected with a public interest" (the
regulation of which would therefore represent a public purpose) would justify
a conclusion that the regulation of farm prices and production in this emergency
is a "public purpose". But if Congress is limited in its taxing power by this
"public purpose" doctrine, it would seem to follow that the purpose for which
the tax is laid must be within its delegated powers. In an effort to bring it within
8
these powers, the Act resorts to the commerce clause of the Constitution.

1. 48

STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. 6o,-6O9 (Supp. 1933).

For an analysis of the taxing
TAx MAG. 330. For a
discussion of the economic problems involved see Jennings and Sullivan, Legal Planning for
Agriculture (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 878.
2. A number of other objections were raised. These were either dealt with adequately
by the court or have been covered by decisions on the validity of other features of the Act.
See United States v. Calistan Packers, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 66o (N. D. Cal. 1933) ; Economy
Dairy Co. v. Wallace, U. S. L. WEEK, Sept. 5, 1933, at 9 (Ship. Ct. D. C. 1933); Capital
City Milk Producers' Association v. Wallace, U. S. L. WEEK, Nov. 21, 1933, at 5 (digest
only) (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1933). See also (1934) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 86. But see Hillsborough Packing Co. v. Wallace, Fed. Tr. & Ind. Serv. (Prentice-Hall) 1142,035, p. 42,035
(S. D. Fla. 1934) retvd on other grounds sub nom. Yarnall v. Hillsborough Packing Co.,
70 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). See also Brewster, Is the Processing Tax Constitutiofal? (1933) ig A. B. A. 3. 419. For contrasting views on the constitutionality of the
Act see Senator Reed's and Senator Bankhead's speeches in the Senate, 77 CONG. REC. 1642,
,7,6-17 (1933).
3. 259 U. S. 20, 37 (1922). See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922).
4. "We have established, we think, beyond cavil that there can be no lawful tax which
is not laid for a public purpose." Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, at 664 (U. S.
1874). Inasmuch as this case dealt with a state statute, it is merely dictum for any such
limitation on the federal taxing power. When the question of such a limitation was before
the Court, it decided the case on other grounds. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
Nevertheless from the sweeping terms used in Loan Association v. Topeka it is reasonable
to infer that such a limitation is inherent in the taxing power of all governments, state or
federal.
5. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (I934).
6. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Attempts to extend this power received a severe
check in "the now perhaps infamous case of Hammer v. Dagenhart", 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
See Note (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 733, 736.

features of the Act see Goodwin, The Processing Taxes (1933) 11
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Whether the present emergency which by the disruption of the consumption power
of the farm element' has adversely affected the flow of interstate commerce will
lead the Supreme Court to extend the scope of the commerce clause will ultimately
depend more upon the social and economic ideology of the individual judges than
on strict legal precedents.s

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY LEGISLATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTE MAKING CODES ADOPTED UNDER TEE NRA THE
STANDARD OF FAIR COMPETITION WITHIN THE STATE-The New York State

Recovery Act (generally known as the Schackno Act)' provides that a code
adopted by an industry under the NRA shall, upon filing of a certified copy
thereof with the Secretary of State, be the standard of fair competition for all
intrastate transactions of that industry. Plaintiff applied for an injunction to
restrain enforcement of the Act, contending it violated both state and federal
constitutions. Held, that the injunction be denied, since the Act is not unconstitutional. Spielman Motor Sales Co., Inc., v. Dodge, 8 F. Supp. 437 (S. D. N. Y.
1934), U. S. L. Week, Oct. 16, at 9.
It is universally recognized that NRA codes apply only to interstate commerce. 2 Consequently numerous states have passed state recovery acts cooperating with the NRA by making industrial codes applicable to and enforceable in
intrastate transactions.3 The instant and another recent case, Cline v. Consumers
Cooperative Gas & Oil Co., 4 involve such an act. A comparison 5 shows that the
two opinions, discussing the standard threefold challenge to this kind of legislation, present a typical situation. It is usually contended that the statute (I)
attempts to give Congress power to regulate intrastate commerce ;6 (2) constitutes
; 7 and (3) sins against
an illegal delegation of the state legislature's authority
8
constitutional prohibitions of "legislation by reference". The Cline case convicts
7. Jennings and Sullivan, supra note i, at 881.
8. Maggs, The Constitution and the Recovery Legislation; The Roles of Document,
Doctrine and Judges (1934) I U. OF CHi. L. REV. 665 at 697.
I. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 781, CAHILLS CoxsoLIDATas N. Y. LAWS (Supp.

1934)

27x.

2. The National Industrial Recovery Act expressly provides that the various powers

shall be directed to transactions "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce". 48 STAT.
195, U. S. C. A. Spec. Pamph., July 1933, 5 et seq., passim. NRA officials themselves
recognize this limitation; see NRA Release No. 5, June 2o, 1933; NRA Release No. 7,
June 22, 1933.

3. At last investigation fourteen states had enacted state recovery acts in aid of the
National Act. These are, besides New York, California, Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. As to the policy involved, see Message of Governor of New York, July 26,
1933, to State Legislature, lo4 C. C. H. fr 14,003. Other jurisdictions which have legislated
less thoroughly, but with the view of lending substantial support to NRA measures, are
Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri and Texas.
4. 152 Misc. 653, 274 N. Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
5. In the Cline case plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants, under the Schackno Act,
from alleged violations of the retail oil and gasoline code. Deciding that plaintiffs had no
standing in court because of unclean hands (id. at 666, 274 N. Y. Supp. at 378), the court
dismissed the complaint on motion. However, since one ground of defendants' motion was
the unconstitutionality of the Act (id. at 667, 274 N. Y. Supp. at 379), that issue, while not
indispensable, was nonetheless considered in detail.
6. Id. at 671, 274 N. Y. Supp. at 383; principal case at 442. Cf. Note (1934) 82 U. or
PA. L. REV. 733.
7. Cline case at 671, 274 N. Y. Supp. at 384; principal case at 442. See Note (1934)
ii N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 6oi, 6o7 et seq.
8. N. Y. CoNsT. art. III, § 17: "No act shall be passed which shall provide that any
existing law or any part thereof shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall
enact that any existing law or part thereof shall be applicable except by inserting it in such
act." See Note (1934) I N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 601-607.
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the Schackno Act of all three offenses; the Spieblan case acquits it of all. It
is believed that the latter, besides being sustained by the slight weight of what
meagre authority exists,0 embodies the better conclusion. Disposal of the first
argument can be made by demonstrating that the very raison d'etre of the Act
is the state sanction of regulations which would otherwise be exclusively under
federal control, and that, far from relinquishing power, the Act asserts it and is
capable of standing as a local recovery measure, unsupported by the Congressional
enactment.10 The second contention can be met by the theory that such statutes
provide a "primary standard", details to be supplied by the President; " that
exhaustive requirements would be totally impracticable; that the issues are essentially national, and the President can hardly be regarded as a foreign power'12
Finally, the third thrust can be parried by pointing out that the statute in no way
purports to incorporate in it the NRA, 13 and that the codes mentioned are not,
strictly speaking, laws within the terms of the constitutional interdiction.'
Although it must be admitted that the practical distinction between enacting a
code as law and merely making it enforceable as such by virtue of the Act is
tenuous at best, nevertheless an overwhelmingly powerful public policy justifies
utilization of so rigidly legalistic a reasoning.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-P. W. A. APPROPRIATIONS-CONSTITUTIONALITY
oiF ACT ALLOWING P. W. A. TO FINANCE MUNICIPAL POWER PLANTS-Plain-

tiff electric company, engaged solely in intrastate generation and distribution of
electricity, brought a bill in equity to enjoin defendant city from constructing
a competing power plant with funds lent and granted by the Federal Public
Works Administrator, under the National Industrial Recovery Act.' Held,
that since Congress "neither intended, nor did it have the power, to aid intra-

state commerce in this way", plaintiff as a franchise-holder may enjoin the
city's illegal competition. Missouri Public Serv4ce Co. v. City of Concordia,
8 F. Supp. I (W. D. Mo. 1934).
9. The Schackno Act has been upheld in Stokes v. Newtown Creek Coal & Coke Co.,

N. Y. Sup. Ct., S. T. Oct. 3, 1934, Prentice-Hall Fed. Trade & Ind. Serv. 11844o (Oct. 12,
I934); Sherman v. Abeles, i5o Misc. 497, 269 N. Y. Supp. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1934) semble.
Substantially similar statutes have been declared constitutional-by lower courts only-in:
Meadows v. Furrow, C. C. Raleigh Co., W. Va., Oct. 11, 1934, Prentice-Hall Fed. Trade &
Ind. Serv. 18451 (Oct. i9, 1934); State v. Marthakis, D. C. 3d D., Salt Lake Co., Utah,
Dec. 29, 1933, 1O4 C. C. H. 5399, 7134 (April 13, 1934); Ex parte Lasswell, 36 P. (2d)
678 (Cal. 1934). Contra: Anderson v. Killen, C. C. McDowell Co., W. Va., Oct. 1, 1934,
Prentice-Hall Fed. Trade & Ind. Serv. 845o (Oct. 19, 1934) ; People v. Capitol Cleaners
& Dyers, Inc., Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co., Feb. 27, 1934, lO4 C. C. H. 5398, 117133
(April 13, 1934).
io. See 1O4 C. C. H. 14,003, 1114,001 (Aug. 8, 1934).
ii. See Ex parte Lasswell, 36 P. (2d) 678, 687 (Cal. 1934).
12. "The correlative rights of state and nation are of great importance, but we are a
nation, not an alliance of foreign states, and our President is not a foreign potentate." Ex
parte Lasswell, 36 P. (2d) 678, 687 (Cal. 1934).
13. Principal case at 442 The court in the Cline case failed to discuss this apparently
obvious ground of attack.
14. Principal case at 442.
i. Title II, 48 STAT. 202 (I933), 40 U. S. C. A. § 403 (Supp. 1933), which authorizes the
President "(i) to . . . finance, or aid in the . . . financing of any public works project
included in the program prepared . . . ; (2) to make grants to . . . municipalities . . .
for the construction, repair, or improvement of any such project."
z Cf. City of Allegan v. Consumers' Power Co., 71 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934),
cert. denied, Oct. 8, 1934, where the court, confronted with a similar set of facts, held that
plaintiff's status as a municipal taxpayer gave him no right to question the constitutionality
of the Recovery Act.
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That the holder of a non-exclusive franchise may enjoin another from
engaging in "illegal" competition, is well settled.3 But this principle has hitherto been applied chiefly where the defendant, if a private person, was operating under a void franchise or none at all, 4 or had failed to comply with statutory
requirements governing such operation.5 Where the defendant was a municipality, injunctions have issued only where the city thfeatened to exceed a statutory or constitutional debt limitation, 6 or lacked properly vested authority.7
The principal case apparently represents the first attempt to dub "illegal" in
such circumstances a measure otherwise completely within the city's jurisdiction, on the ground that it was rendered possible by the acceptance of funds
which the payor presumably lacked authority to grant. Even assuming the
validity of this proposition, however, there remains the question of its applicability to P. W. A. grants. That Congress did not intend the act in question to
apply to intrastate commerce is an interpretation scarcely sustained by the
language of the statute, which places no less emphasis on the desire "to reduce
and relieve unemployment" than "to remove obstructions to the free flow of
interstate . . . commerce".,

That Congress had at any rate no power to pro-

vide for appropriations to projects within the exclusive control of the states 9
is a judgment strangely belated, if correct; for the past twenty years have beheld a great variety of such grants, the validity of which has gone virtually
unquestioned.'" Apparently the sole exception to this general acquiescence, an
attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the Maternity Act,"- encountered
the Supreme Court's refusal to pass on the question, on the ground that a taxpayer's interest in Congressional appropriations is too remote and indirect to
permit him to question their constitutionality." Whether the interest of a
municipal franchise-holder is equally remote for this purpose has not as yet
3. The franchise-holder is granted relief on the basis of the "due process" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a franchise having been recognized as a "property right". Frost
v. Corp. Comm. of Okla., 278 U. S. 515 (1929).

4. Patterson v. Wollmann, 5 N. D. 6o8, 67 N. W. 1O4O (18)6) ; Citizens' Electric Co.
v. Power Co., 255 Pa. 145, 99 Atl. 462 (ii6); Northern Texas Utilities Co. v. Gas Co.,
297

S. W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).

5. The defendant's operations are then termed a nuisance per se. Puget Sound Traction
Co. v. Grassmeyer,

1O2

Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504 (ii8).

6. City of Campbell v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., 55 F. (2d) 56o (C. C. A. 8th,

1932).

Cf. Hight v. City of Harrisonville, 328 Mo. 549, 41 S. W. (2d) 155 (193)

(plain-

tiffs sued simply as "citizens and taxpayers").
7. Gallardo v. Porto Rico Light and Power Co., x8 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. Ist, 1927).
Cf. Lindsley v. Dallas Ry., 2oo S. W. 2o7 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).

8. The quotations are from the Congressional "Declaration of Policy" which introduces
the National Industrial Recovery Act. 48 STAT. 195 (1933), I U. S. C. A. § 70l (Supp.
1933). For an indication that the Public Works Administration was designed chiefly "with
a view to increasing employment quickly", see title II of the Act, 48 STAT. 202 (1933), 40 U.
S. C. A. § 403 (Supp. 1933). The careful inclusion of such familiar judicial shibboleths as
"national emergency", and "affects the public welfare", would seem to indicate a clear Congressional hope that the courts, possibly in the name of such phrases as those invoked, will
uphold the Act without qualification.
9. See principal case at 4. Congress "would have no authority to grant aid to the
construction of a plant over which it would have no legislative authority." This dictum
resembles Marshall's statement, also obiter, that "Congress is not empowered to tax for
those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the States." Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. I, igg (U. S. 1824). See Corwin, The Spending .Power of Congress (1923) 36
HARV. L. Rv. 548, 576, n. 76.
IO. E. g., 38 STAT. 372 (1914), 7 U. S. C. A. § 341 (1927) ; 39 STAT. 929 (1917), 20
U. S. C. A. § ii (1927) (appropriations for promotion of agricultural extension work).
See Corwin, supra note 8, at 575.
ii. 42 STAT. 224 (1921), 42 U. S. C. A. § 163 (I927), providing for appropriations to
further state activities in maternity hygiene.
12. Massachusetts v. Mellon, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923),
U. OF PA. L. REV. 72.
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been decided. 13 The court in the instant case would apparently raise the question, though indirectly, by permitting the plaintiff to contest the offeree's right
to accept funds from the federal government-without passing on his right to
challenge the government's power to grant them.' 4 The general reluctance of
courts at present to interfere with federal prerogatives not nearly so wellestablished as the right to make appropriations indicates that extensive emulation of this decision is unlikely. 5
CONTRACTS-SALES-SUBSTITUTION BY RETAILER OF ANOTHER ARTICLE
AS BREACH OF CONTRACT TO Buy ALL OF CERTAIN PRODUCT THAT IT COULD

SELL-Plaintiffs, producers and retailers of a quality milk, for which there was
an established market, sold its retailing business and equipment to defendant,
and contracted to sell to defendant all the milk it produced., Defendant, a
large scale retailer of milk, contracted to buy all of plaintiffs' bottled milk that
it could sell.2 Defendant thereafter vigorously advertised another milk and
delivered the advertised milk to consumers of plaintiffs' milk, in place of the
plaintiffs' milk, when not ordered by the consumer, for the purpose of inducing
the consumer to switch to the advertised milk. Held, that defendant's conduct
constituted a breach of contract. Poston v. Western Dairy Products Co., 36 P.
(2d) 65 (Wash. 1934).
The contract in the instant case differed from a "requirements" contract
in that defendant promised to buy "all it could sell", and not "all it should
require", and in that plaintiffs' milk was only a fraction of the total milk sold
by defendant. There appears to be no prior authority for an interpretation of
the words "all it could sell", but they seem to place a greater obligation on the
buyer than "requirements" contracts. The former refers to an objective fact,
i. e., the buyer's ability to sell, while the latter often depends upon the buyer's
opinion as to the advisability of a course of action involving the purchase.8 The
13. Cf. City of Allegan v. Consumers' Power Co., 71 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934),
cited supra note 2, where the holder of a franchise sought to have the P. W. A. appropriation declared unconstitutional. But plaintiff sued simply in his capacity as a taxpayer.
14. There remains also the interesting question whether, if a franchise-holder may thus
prevent a governmental grant from taking effect, a mere taxpayer may do the same. A
dictum in the principal case at 4, answers affirmatively. "The plaintiff, as a taxpayer,
would have a right to interfere." As the threatened injury to himself, the taxpayer might
utilize the possibility of the Attorney-General's requiring the city to return the grant, thus
compelling it to exceed its debt limitation. City of Allegan v. Consumers' Power Co., 71 F.
(2d) 477 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) ; Note (934) 48 HARv. L. RaV. 89.
15. E. g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 5o2 (934), which revealed an attitude of a
majority of the Supreme Court in striking contrast with that of the court in the instant case.
I. Plaintiffs agreed to sell to defendant all "special bottled milk" produced by them,
and deliver same in bottles at defendant's loading platform in Spokane. Plaintiffs also
agreed to sell all milk produced by them, not to exceed 2,5oo pounds per day, including the
bottled milk.
2. Defendant agreed to purchase from plaintiffs, "all of their special bottled milk it
can (could) sell at fifteen cents per quart and pay . . . therefor the sum of eleven and a
half cents per quart." Such of plaintiffs' milk as could not be sold as special bottled milk
was to be purchased by defendant at a price of fifteen cents per hundred pounds above the
prevailing price for "bulk milk". This contract was for one year, but was to run from year
to year unless ninety days' notice was given by either party.
3. The least obligation of some "requirements" contracts has been held to be either to
go out of business or not to buy the same article from another. Drake v. Vorse, 52 Iowa
417, 3 N. W. 465 (i879); Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co., 154 Minn. 2o4, 191 N. W. 431
(1923) ; McKeever, Cook & Co. v. Canonsburg Iron Co., 138 Pa. 184, 2o Atl. 938 (I89o) ;
see Nassau Supply Co. v. Ice Service Co., 252 N. Y. 277, I69 N. E. 383 (i929) ; Havighurst
and Berman, Requirements and Output Contracts, (i93z) 27 ILI L. REV. i. Contra:
Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 Fed. 298 (C. C. A. 6th 1903) ;
National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Manufacturing Co., iio Ill. 427 (1884); Wells v.
Alexandre, 13o N. Y. 642, 29 N. E. 142 (i8gi).
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facts of this case strengthen this interpretation. It is inconceivable that plaintiffs would dispose of their retailing organization and equipment while continuing to produce milk, without providing for the sale of the milk. Plaintiffs
also contracted to sell all the milk they produced to the defendant exclusively.
The parties could hardly have intended that defendant's obligation was anything less than to use reasonable efforts to sell plaintiffs' milk, in view of plaintiffs' dependence on these sales for their business existence. The instant case

4
is much more analogous to a group of "exclusive agency" cases, in which the

courts have found an implied promise by the agent to use reasonable efforts
to sell the goods. The relationship is that of vendor and vendee and not of
principal and agent, but the basic factors are the same as in the agency cases.
As plaintiffs' milk was only a fraction of the milk sold by the defendant, a
general advertising of other milk need not be inconsistent with reasonable efforts
to sell plaintiffs' milk. However, the deliberate efforts to switch consumers of
plaintiffs' milk to the other milk are clearly a breach of the implied promise
to use reasonable efforts to sell the plaintiffs' milk.

EXECUTORS AND ADmINISTRATORS-POwER OF COURT TO ATTACH PERSON

OF EXECUTOR FOR FAILURE TO PAY A DEBT WHICH HE OWED THE ESTATEPlaintiffs, as legatees, filed exceptions to defendant executor's account, alleging
that though he was solvent during administration he had failed to inventory a
debt which he owed the testator. Orphans' Court decreed that defendant pay
plaintiffs the amount of the debt with interest. When defendant failed to pay,
he was attached for contempt. Basing his request on the statute abolishing imprisonment for debt,' defendant then moved that the attachment be quashed.
Held, that the attachment was proper, since it had issued for a breach of trust
and not for failure to pay a debt. In re Weaver's Estate, 174 Atl. 9o5 (Pa.
1934).
In order to support the attachment, the court employed the time-honored
2
fiction that an executor who is indebted to the decedent is presumed as an individual to have paid himself as a fiduciary; hence his failure to pay this debt
is in law a failure to account for assets of the estate entrusted to him as exec4- Hayes v. Clark, 95 Conn. 510, 11 Atl. 781 (192o); Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917) ; Paige v. Faure, 229 N. Y. 114, 127 N. E. 898
RESTATEmENT,
(i920); Taylor Co. v. Bannerman, 12o Wis. i89, 97 N. W. 918 (104);
AGENCY (933) § 377 (b) ; see Ehrenworth v. Stuhmer, 229 N. Y. 210, 128 N. E. ioS (1920).
i. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 257. It has been held that a decree itself
does not create a debt within the statute; see Chew's Appeal, 44 Pa. 247 (1863) (sustaining
an attachment for trustee's failure to obey decree ordering distribution of trust funds).
Cf. Scott v. The Jailer, I Grant 237 (Pa. 1855) (holding that decree in equity for payment
of money due upon a contract cannot be enforced by attachment).
2. Originally the debt was extinguished at law since a man could not sue himself; see
Nedham's Case, 8 Co. I35a, 136a (C. P. 16io); Wankford v. Wankford, I Salk. 2W (K. B.
1698). But if other assets of the estate were insufficient to pay creditors, appointment of a
debtor as executor was treated as a specific bequest valid only after testator's debts were
paid. 2 Co. LITr. (Butler's ed. 1832) 264 b, n. i. Then the so-called "equitable rule" was
adopted, making the debt an asset for payment of both creditors and legatees. Flud v.
Rumcey, Yelv. 16o (K. B. 16o9); Brown v. Selwyn, Cas. t. Talbot 240 (Ch. 1734);
Carey v. Goodinge, 3 Bro. C. C. io (Ch. 1790) ; see Dorchester v. Webb, Cro. Car. 372,
373 (K. B. 1633). However, none of these cases required precise definition of the obligation. The presumption was used at an early date in Pennsylvania. Griffith v. Chew's
Executor, 8 S. & R. 17 (Pa. 1822). At the present time most states put the "equitable"
rule in statutory form. Cf. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § lO592 (stating that "appointment . . . is not a discharge of the debt") with CAL. PROBATE CODE (Deering, 1931)
§ 602 (making executor liable "as for so much money in his hands"). See also PA. STAT.
§ 445.
ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. o20,
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utor. 3 Though generally used to hold an executor liable,- this presumption has
been discarded and the obligation treated as a debt for various purposes: to
relieve an insolvent executor from his duty to pay; 5 to permit the running of
interest on the debt after appointment; 6 and to require a jury trial where the
executor disputes his liability.7

Such theoretical inconsistencies could have been

avoided and the same result reached in the instant case by treating the executor's
failure to "collect" his own debt as analogous to his favoring a stranger indebted
to the estate. It has been settled that an executor who knowingly fails to
enforce an obligation owed the estate by a solvent debtor is liable for the amount
thereby lost to the estate5 and is subject to attachment for his failure to pay.9
In that situation, as in the one under discussion, the executor has committed a
breach of his fiduciary obligation to administer loyally. 10 By placing the emphasis on this general duty of an executor "- instead of fictitiously denominating
him a trustee of the "assets" presumed to arise from the one obligation, the court
in the instant case2 could have made the correctness of its decision more immediately apparent.'

TO

INJUNCTIONS-RAcIAL DISCRIMINATION AS A GROUND FOR THE RIGHT
PIcKET-NECESSITY OF A LABOR DisPUTE-Plaintiff maintained a

store in the Harlem district of New York City, and refused to comply with
negro defendants' demands that a certain percentage of negroes be employed.
Defendants thereupon picketed the store. Plaintiff applied for an interlocutory
injunction to restrain the picketing. Held, that the motion be granted, since
even peaceful picketing,' privileged in the furtherance of a labor dispute, may
3. See principal case at 9o6.
4. The leading case in America is Stevens v. Gaylord, Ii Mass. 255 (1814); see Baucus
v. Stover, 89 N. Y. I (1882); Tracy v. Card, 2 Ohio St. 431 (1853); Chick v. Farr, 31
S. C. 463, io S. E. 176 (1889) ; Estate of Robinson v. Hodgkin, 99 Wis. 327, 74 N. W. 791
(1898). In New York the point raised by the instant case has been treated on two occasions.

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court made a ruling similar to that rendered in the
instant case [Matter of Strong, In App. Div. 28r, 97 N. Y. Supp. 459 (ist Dep't i9o6)],
while the Surrogate's Court refused to attach an insolvent executor on the ground that it
would constitute imprisonment for debt. Rugg v. Jenks, 4 Den. io5 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1886).
5. Only a minority of. jurisdictions hold the executor although he is insolvent. 2
WOERNER, AMmfcAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) § 311 and cases cited.
6. Matter of Davis, 37 Misc. 326, 75 N. Y. Supp. 493 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 192) ; Rodenbach's Appeal, lO2 Pa. 572 (1883).
7. Wilson v. Ruthrauff, 82 Mo. App. 435 (19oo). Contra: In re Estate of Parker, 189
Iowa I131, 179 N. W. 525 (1g2o). The obligation has been-treated as a debt for still other
purposes: (I) to preserve a mortgage securing the obligation. Stewart v. Hurd, 107 Me. 457,
78 Ati. 838 (1911) ; Crow v. Conant, go Mich. 247, 51 N. W. 45o (1892) ; Soverhill v. Suy-

dam, 59 N. Y. 140 (2874) ;- (2) to maintain priority of judgment lien obtained by testator.
Anderson v. Anderson, 183 Pa. "8o7-8Atl. 1007 (I898).
8. Chamber's Appeal, ii Pa. 436 (1849) ; 2 WoERNER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 324.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) tit. 20, § 2372.
io. RESTATEMENT, TRusTs (Tent. Draft, 193o) §§ 165, 172; see Rader v. Yeargin, 85
Tenn. 486, 490, 3 S. W. 178, 179 (1887).
ii. In disposing of another defense urged by the executor, the court mentioned this
duty. Principal case at 9o7.

12. It should be pointed out that the presumption has served an important purpose

historically. Originally, since the debt was discharged by appointment, the executor would
not have been guilty of a failure to "administer loyally" in neglecting to pay it. It was
the presumption which first imposed the duty to account for the debt. Now that this duty
has been recognized by statute, more realistic treatment is possible.
I. The court declined to consider plaintiff's allegations of violence, intimidation, and
misrepresentation. It is generally agreed that such abuses will be enjoined. American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921); Kolley v. Robinson, 187 Fed.
415 (C. C. A. 8th, I911) ; Rice, etc., Co. v. Willard, 242 Mass. 566, 136 N. E. 629 (1922);
O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, 37 Ati. 843 (897).
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not be conducted upon grounds of mere racial discrimination. A. S. Beck Shoe
Corp. v. Johnson, N. Y. L. J., Nov. I, 1934, at 1573 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1934).
The instant case is one of first impression 2 in a jurisdiction where the
Since
picketing privilege of labor unions has been extensively recognized.'
there was here involved no dispute over working conditions, and no attempt to
unionize, the court found no basis for granting the privilege. However, the
impossibility of fitting the situation into the category of a labor dispute should
not necessitate such a result. There may well be considerations in favor of
giving such privileges to the negro race quite as compelling as those which have
brought about the liberalization of the judicial attitude toward labor. In that
field, the modern tendency to permit direct action 4 represents a hard-won advance from the early decisions condemning all combinations for common action
against employers, as criminal conspiracies.- The court in the instant case dismissed the problem of underlying social policy by alluding briefly to potential
race conflicts. While it may be conceded that such conflicts are to be discouraged, this reason for denying the picketing privilege is not altogether persuasive. Some degree of violence seems to be an inevitable concomitant of any
self-enforced improvement in the lot of previously subjected groups, as the turbulence of many labor disputes will bear witness. The alternative of abandoning all attempts at progress is scarcely preferable. There appear to be more basic
factors which the court overlooked. The essential purpose behind the liberal
attitude toward labor would seem to be the advisability of raising living standards and ultimately reducing the sociological and economic burdens upon the
community as a whole which accompany the subjugation of any large group
therein. 6 The economic progress of the negro race should, for this same reason, be a proper subject of community concern.' A contrary decision in the
principal case would have given impetus to the development of the negro in
segregated districts by obliging white employers, if they remained in the district
in competition with negro stores, to employ negro help.8 This result would
further the above-discussed objective; a broader viewpoint than that taken by
2. Only one other case on the point has been found in any jurisdiction. Samuelson v.
Green, Baltimore Daily Record, May 26, 1934, at 5 (Cir. Ct. of Baltimore City 1934).
There, too; the picketing was enjoined, the court discussing the labor cases and refusing to
extend the principles therein developed.
3. Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 13o
(1927) ; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928);
Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 69o (i3i).
4. While there are still conflicts among the various jurisdictions as to what means of
attack may be employed by labor unions, the general trend is toward broadening judicial

sanction for such action. On the entire subject of justifiable ends and means, see FRANCKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 24 et seq. There has been considerable
legislation dealing with the problem. For a critical analysis of the statutes and their
results see Frankfurter and Greene, Legislation Affecting Labor Injunctions (1929) 38
op. cit. supra, at
YALE L. J. 879, reprinted in substance in FRANKFURTER AND GREEN-,
134 et seq.

5. People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler's Cr. Cas. 262 (N. Y. Gen. Sess. 181o); Rex v.
Journeymen-Taylors, 8 Mod. II (1721). This doctrine was modified by the classic case
of Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. in (Mass. 1842), which set up the rule that criminality
might be avoided by showing justifiable ends and means.
6. While a humanitarian outlook is doubtless responsible for a large share of such
progress as has been made in the labor field, much of it may fairly be attributed to a growing realization that it is to the ultimate advantage of the better-situated classes to improve
the lot of those in comparatively helpless economic positions.
7. A related problem is the educational progress of the negro race. For a thorough
discussion of this topic see Note (933)

82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 157.

8. It is interesting to note that the picketing which led to the case of Samuelson v.
Green, Baltimore Daily Record, May 26, 1934, at 5 (Cir. Ct. of Baltimore City 1934) had
been successful in procuring employment of negroes in the A. & P. stores in Baltimore's
colored neighborhoods, before it was brought to bear upon the plaintiffs in that action.
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the court may, in future cases, lead to an adoption of such an approach to a
controversial and far-reaching problem.9

OF BROADCAST
BROADCASTING-RIGHTS
LITERARY PROPERTY-RADIO
SPONSOR IN MATERIAL OF ARTIST'S BROADCAST-Artist contracted to render

his services to broadcast sponsor and to supply the necessary script for broadcasting. By virtue of a subsequent assignment from the artist, publisher sought
to publish the subject matter of the broadcast. Held, that broadcast sponsor
was entitled to an injunction restraining publisher from publishing or distributing any publication containing the script of the broadcast. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934).
The script of a broadcast represents a combination of ideas,' and as such
is the subject of literary property-a term designating the sum of an author's
rights, privileges, etc., in his intellectual production.' The totality of rights
conferred by the common law is referred to as the author's common law copyright, and is distinct from a statutory copyright. 3 The common law copyright
is destroyed by publication,4 but until then the author has. exclusive control over
his unpublished work.5 This right may be vested in another by assignment,6
or by contract of employment. 7 So, in the instant case, the artist being employed to supply the script for the broadcast, exclusive control of the material
of the script vested in the broadcast sponsor until general publication or alienation.8 This case is, apparently, of first impression on the question whether
broadcasting operates as a sufficient publication to divest the common law copyright of the sponsor. Since existing definitions of publication 9 were made
without reference to radio broadcasting, the decision must be tested by resort to
analogy. Thus, the recitation of a poem has been held not to constitute a publication, 10 nor the public performance of a musical composition," motion picture,' - lecture,'" or dramatic composition. 14 These decisions offer potent sup9. The problem becomes much more delicate, and quite different considerations may
enter in, where the neighborhood is less predominantly colored, or in case the same methods
were to be applied in religious conflicts. Enthusiastic indorsement may readily be given to
the policy enunciated in the instant case of deciding each case strictly upon its own facts.
i. See Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281, 287, x71 N. E. 56, 58 (i93o); Note (193o)

15 CoRN. L. Q. 633.
2. (1922) 22 CoL. L. Rav. 182.
3. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 59o (U. S. 1834); Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co.,
2,5 U. S. 182 (op).

4. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. i82 (39o9); Palmer v. De Witt, 47
Contra: Millar v.
N. Y. 532 (1872); Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P. C. 129 (774).
Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (K. B. 1769); DRONF, COPY RIHT (1879) 116.
5. Crowe v. Aiken, 2 Biss. 28 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 187o); see Atlantic Monthly Co. v.
Post Publishing Co., 27 F. (2d) 556, 558 (D. Mass. 1928).
6. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617 (1888) ; Harms v. Stern, 229 Fed. 42 (C. C. A.
2d, 1916) ; Morris v. Kelly, i Jac. & W. 481 (Ch. 1820).
7. Mallory v. Mackaye, 86 Fed. 122 (S. D. N. Y. i898); Colliery Engineer Co. v.
United Correspondence Schools Co., 94 Fed. 152 (S. D. N. Y. 1899); Sweet v. Benning, I6
C. B. 459 (855) ; Lawrence & Bullen v. Aflalo, [39o4] A. C. i7.
8. The validity of an injunction to restrain unauthorized use of intellectual creations is
well established. Kortlander v. Bradford, 116 Misc. 664, i9o N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct.
1921). In Harms v. Stem, 229 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916), order vacated, 231 Fed. 645
(C. C. A. 2d, I916), the court denied an injunction prayed for by the subsequent assignee
of the author against the original assignee.
9. Infra note 17.
io. Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
ii. McCarthy & Fisher v. White, 259 Fed. 364 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
12. DeMille Co. v. Casey, 121 Misc. 78, 201 N. Y. Supp. (Sup. Ct. 1923).
13. Nutt v. National Inst., Inc., 31 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
14. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (i91i) and cases there cited.
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port to the instant holding.1" Nor do the decisions that broadcasting is a
"public performance for profit" within the meaning of the Copyright Act in
any way weaken that support '"-the performance of a play is just as much
a public performance for profit, and still such performance is not publication.
The apparent insistence that publication must be an actual printing and public
distribution of copies of the work, 17 suggests that the rule that publication divests common law copyright is without reason 1s and that the courts are thus
in effect emasculating the rule by strict interpretation.

STATES-QUALIFICATION

FOR OFFICE-EFFECT OF CONVICTION OF FEL-

ONY IN FEDERAL COURT WHEN CRIME IS ONLY MISDEMEANOR UNDER STATE

LAw-Respondent, Governor of North Dakota, was convicted in a federal
is a felony,, but under
court of criminal conspiracy, which under federal statutes
2
the laws of North Dakota is only a misdemeanor. Quo warranto proceedings
were instituted against him. The Constitution of North Dakota provides that
no person convicted of felony is a qualified elector,s and 4 that no person is
eligible to hold the governship unless he is a qualified elector. Held (one judge
dissenting), that respondent was ineligible to hold office. State ex rel. Olson v.
Langer, 256 N. W. 377 (N. D. 1934).

It is well recognized that a person cannot be penalized in one jurisdiction
under a criminal judgment procured in another., Disqualification from office,
however, is not considered a penalty, but merely an incidental loss of privilege" Accordingly, a lawyer may be disbarred because he has been convicted
of felony in a foreign jurisdiction.' This results from the desirability of bari5. DAvis, LAW OF RADIO COmaUNICATION (1927) 145 et seq. But cf. Note (1934) 19
ST. Louis L. REv. 323, at 336.
16. Note (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 549. These decisions would control if all
judicial language in publication cases were as broad as that of Mr. Justice Hughes in
Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424, at 434 (1911): "It is not open to dispute that the
authors . . . had a common law right of property in the play until it was publicly perjormed." (Italics supplied.)
17. "'Publication' means 'the act of publishing a thing or making it public, offering to
public notice; or rendering it accessible to public scrutiny.' . . . In copyright law, it is
'the act of making public a book; that is offering or communicating it to the public by sale
Dole v. Kansas City Star Co., 94 Fed. 84o, at 842 (C. C. W. D.
or distribution of copies.'
publication of a work . . . means simply the placing of the copies at
Mo. 1899). ". .
the disposal of the public, whether by sale or gift." DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT
LAW (1925) 29. "Properly speaking, a work is published when it is communicated to the
general public . . . The owner of a literary composition which has not been published in
print or by circulation of copies [may use it] . . . without any prejudice to his commonlaw rights therein." DRONE, COPYRIGHT (1879) 115, 118.
18. Id. at 8, et seq.
18 U. S.
I. 35 STAT. 1096 (I909), i8 U. S. C. A. § 88 (1927) ; 35 STAT. 1152 (I90),
C. A. §541 (I927).
2. N. D. Comp. LAWS (I913) § 9441.
3. N. D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (as amended by art. II of amendments).
4. N. D. CON ST. art. III, § 73.
5. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 669 (1892); Commonwealth v. Green, I7
Mass. 515, 546 (1822) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNFLaCT OF LAWS (1934) § 4276. The distinguishing features are (I) disqualification is not part of the criminal judgment but is collateral thereto; (2) disqualification is not imposed to punish the offender,
but because he has shown himself a person unfit for trust; and (3) the commission of the
act works the disqualification, and the judgment is merely evidence of its commission. Ex
parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882) ; State v. Jones, 82 N. C. 685 (188o) ; see McKannay v.
Horton, 151 Cal. 711, 720, 91 Pac. 598, 6oi (19o7).
-. Barnes v. District Court, 178 Cal. 500, 173 Pac. Ioo (1918) ; In re Kerl, 32 Idaho
737, i88 Pac. 40 (19"2o); In re Minner, 133 Kan. 789, 3 P. (2d) 473 (1931). Contra:
Matter of Ebbs, i5o N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 19o (1go8).
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ring unfit men from positions of public trust. No such consideration applies
to the eligibility of a witness in private litigation, hence the unpopular rule disqualifying a witness convicted of felony has been restricted so that conviction
of felony in a foreign state does not work a disqualification., In the instant
case, the court rejected the analogy urged to the rule as to witnesses, and held
that, as to officeholders, conviction of felony in a foreign jurisdiction works
a disability, though the crime is no felony in the original state. This doctrine
was criticised in the dissent as making disqualification from office dependent
upon the laws of other states, and it is doubtful if it would be followed in an
extreme case. The fact that the territorial jurisdiction of the federal court
was geographically identical with that of the state courts may have carried
weight. Moreover, respondent's crime involved moral turpitude, 9 but the court
refrained from basing its decision upon this ground, and wisely so, since the
meaning of "moral turpitude" is very indefinite,10 and consequently open to
abuse. The result reached is socially desirable under these facts, although there
is contrary authority." A more definite and practicable view, it is submitted,
would be that conviction of felony in a foreign jurisdiction should work a disqualification when the crime is an offense in the original state (disregarding the
arbitrary distinction between felonies and misdemeanors), but that if it is no
offense in the original state, no disability should attach.,2 This would produce
the same result in the instant case without subjecting the decision to the objection voiced in the dissent, and would also achieve the purpose behind the rulethat only those fit to be trusted should hold office.

TAXATION-COLLECTION

AND

ENFORCEMENT-EXTRA-STATE

ENFORCE-

MENT OF REVENUE JUDGMENTS-The state of New York obtained a valid judg-

ment against the defendant, a New Jersey corporation doing business in New
York, for unpaid franchise taxes. Action on this judgment was instituted in
New Jersey. Defendant contended the action was to enforce a penal judgment
144 U. S. 263 (i89i); Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass.
522. Contra: State
(1822), cited note 5, supra; i WI oRm, EVIDENCE (2d ed. ig--)
v. Foley, 15 Nev. 64 (i88o) ; Chase v. Blodgett, io N. H. 22 (1838); State v. Candler, 3
Hawks 393 (N. C. 1824).
9. Respondent and others had conspired to block the federal government's recovery
program through soliciting part of the pay of federal relief workers as contributions to
"The Leader", a Republican party organ. The employees were asked to "purchase" subscription books to the amount of about five per cent. of their salaries. N. Y. Times, June 17,
X934, § , at 2; id. July 29, 1934, § 8, at zi.
507, 11 Atl. 86r, 863
1o. See Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 5o0,
(i2o) ; Ex parte Mason, 29 Ore. 18, 23, 43 Pac. 651, 652 (i86) ; Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa.
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8. Logan v. United States,

522, 524 (1853).

ii. The following cases are in accord with the principal case: Crampton v. O'Mara,
i93 Ind. 551, 139 N. E. 360 (1923), writ of error denied, 267 U. S. 575 (925) ; State ex reL
Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 8 P. (2d) 791 (1932) ; State ex reL. Beckman v. Bowman, 38 Ohio App. 237, 175 N. E. 89T (193o) ; see United States v. Barnabo, Fed. Cas. No.
14,522, at ioo8 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1876) ; Cowan v. Prowse, 93 Ky. 156, 171, 19 S. W. 407,
411 (i82). The following cases are contra the principal case: Hildreth v. Heath, I Ill.
App. 82 (1878) ; State ex reL. Mitchell v. McDonald, 164 Miss. 405, 145 So. 5o8 ('933);
cf. State v. Du Bose, 88 Tenn. 753, 13 S. W. 1088 (iSgo).
12. Ex parte Biggs, 52 Ore. 433, 97 Pac. 713 (1908), was decided in conformance with

this reasoning. This case held that conviction of felony in a foreign state did not work a
disqualification, since the crime committed was no offense in Oregon. The court said, by
way of dictum (at 435, 97 Pac. at 714) : "Neither the words 'felony' or 'misdemeanor' of
themselves have any exactness or precision of definition . . . If the conviction is of an
offense which, under the laws of this state, .is a felony or a misdemeanor . . . it is sufficient ground for

.

.

. removal or suspension, . . . whether such conviction took place

here or not." The effect of conviction of felony in a foreign jurisdiction was limited in a
similar manner in Chase v. Blodgett, 1o N. H. 22 (1838), cited note 8, supra, and Matter of
Comyns, 132 Wash. 391, 232 Pac. 269 (1925).
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and therefore could not be entertained in New Jersey. Held, that a franchise
tax is a debt which defendant by doing business in New York impliedly promised to pay, and a judgment for such tax will be enforced in New Jersey.
People v. Coe Mfg. Co., 112 N. J. L. 536, 172 Atl. 198 (934), cert. denied,
55 Sup. Ct. 89 (1934).
The rule that one state will not enforce the 'revenue laws of another,
founded on an economic expediency" not existent among our free trade states
today, has been kept alive only by classifying revenue claims with penal claims.2
It has proved an insuperable barrier to a state trying to collect taxes, validly
imposed, from one who has physically removed himself and his property from
its borders.3 The United States Supreme Court has never directly rendered
an opinion on the matter, but from the definition of "penal laws" in Huntington v. Attrill,4 it is difficult to reconcile this classification of revenue with
penal claims. Furthermore, a policy argument, similar to that leading courts
to refuse to enforce the penal laws of another state, has been the only serious
objection made to, the extra-territorial enforcement of revenue laws.' But
while in the former case rules of policy may vary as senses of morality differ,
there is little chance of differences in opinion in the latter, since almost all states
procure their revenue by similar methods, and the Supreme Court has well defined the constitutional limits of the taxing power.' Moreover, this question
of policy is expressly excluded by the decisions in Fauntleroy v. Luwm 7 and
Kenney v. Supreme Lodge ", so that it cannot be a determinative factor when,
as in the principal case, the court has before it not a revenue claim, but a revenue judgment from a sister state. Further, this attitude of giving more rigorous effect to the "full faith and credit" clause has not been confined to the
United States Supreme Court, and at least two state courts, despite the dictum
in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. CoY and the negative implication from Huntingi. The origin of the rule was in England's refusal to enforce foreign tax claims on

goods smuggled into England because they feared this might injure British commerce. See
Note (929) 29 Cot. L. REv. 782.
2. The origin of the rule against enforcing foreign penal laws in this country is found
in a statement by Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 23 U. S. 30, 38 (1825): "The

courts of no country execute the penal laws of another . . ." The first application of the
rule as to revenue laws was Maryland v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 132 N. Y. Supp. 173 (I91I),

where the court likened revenue laws to penal laws. For a discussion of cases since the
original application of the rule see Note (1930) 5 Wis. L. Rxv. 494, where the author also

points out that no reasons have been advanced for the holding.
3. See Note (1934) 3 MERCER BEASLEY L. REv. i99. An excellent illustration is

furnished by Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (193o). See especially Mr. Justice Stone's
dissent.
4. 146 U. S. 657, 683 (1892). The test of whether or not a law is penal is "whether it
appears to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it, to be, in its essential character
and effect, a punishment of an offense against the public, or the grant of a civil right to a
private person".
5. See concurring opinion by Learned Hand, J., in Moore v. Mitchell, 3o F. (2d) 6oo
at 603 (1929), criticized in Note (i933) 18 CoRN. L. Q. 581. See Leflar, Extra-State
Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 193, for other
possible objections and answers thereto.
6. Ibid. See Note (1929) 29 Col. L. REV. 782.
(that nature of the original liability is contra to the public
7. 210 U. S. 230 (198o)
policy of the forum is no reason for denying full faith and credit to the judgment).
8. 252 U. S. 411 (1920) (that statute giving rise to action limited its enforcement to
that state is no reason to refuse to recognize the judgment.) See Loughran v. Loughran,
292 U. S. 216, 222 (1934) ; McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U. S. 230, :233 (934).
9. 1:27 U. S. 265, 29o (1888). "The rule that the courts of no country execute the
penal laws of another applies . . . to all suits in favor of the state for the recovery of
pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue . . . and
to all judgments for such penalties." In Fauntleroy v. Lum, 2IO U. S. 230, 237 (Igo8),
Justice Holmes referred to this as dictum and refused to discuss it.
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ton v. Attrill "- that penal judgments need not be enforced, have given extraterritorial effect to judgments which they have regarded as penal." In view
of this attitude and of the further considerations of the present concentration
of wealth in intangibles easily transported across state lines, as well as the
pressing and immediate need of the federal and state governments for revenue, 12
the Supreme Court will probably hold that revenue judgments, at least, are to
be accorded faith and credit.' 3 It is unfortunate that the court in the instant
case, although recognizing the fundamental problem involved,' 4 failed to grasp
the opportunity to take the first step toward the elimination of the rule against
the enforcement of foreign revenue laws and placed its decision on an ill-conceived fiction.Y
TAXATION-INHERITANCE

AND

TRANSFER

TAXES-DETERMINATION

OF

SITUS OF TANGIBLE PERSONALTY FOR INHERITANCE TAXATION PURPOSES-A

New York resident lent paintings for free exhibition to a Pennsylvania museum conducted on a non-profit basis, with the understanding that they be
returned on demand. A request for return was made, but the owner reconsidered and continued the loan, consenting to sell the pictures to any purchaser
who would donate the collection to the museum. Two years and ten months
after first making the loan, the owner died at his residence. Under a tax statute 1 Pennsylvania levied an inheritance tax on the paintings. New York had
previously levied a tax which the executor had paid under protest. Executor
of decedent's estate brought suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. New York
intervened in the proceedings. Held, that Pennsylvania had exclusive jurisdiction to tax the transfer of the paintings. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 55 Sup. Ct. 29 (1934).
Though the early decisions followed the maxim, 'mobiliasequuntur personam,
and allowed taxation of tangible personalty at the owner's domicil,2 the doctrine has now crystallized that tangible personal property is taxable only in the
state in which it has an actual situs.' Any attempt to tax by another stateThe Court said that if the judgment was not for a penalty
10. 146 U. S. 657 (1892).
it had to be enforced. The inference seems that if it were for a penalty, it would not have
to be enforced.
ii. Schuler v. Schuler, 209 IIl. 522, 71 N. E. 16 (19o4) ; Symons v. Eichelberger, 11o
Ohio St. 224, 144 N. E. 279 (i924). These cases are weakened somewhat in that the
judgments were not "penal" in the Huntington v. Attrill sense. The former arose from a
support order in a bastardy proceeding and the latter was for costs in a divorce action. It is
also to be noted that in Holshower v. Copper Co., 138 N. C. 248, 50 S. E. 650 (I9o5), North
Carolina allowed New Jersey to file a claim with a receiver appointed by the court to
liquidate corporate assets, for franchise taxes. See RESTATEmENT, CONFLCT oF LAws
(1934) § 443, where the rule is stated that a foreign judgment for the payment of money
which has been obtained in favor of a state, on a cause of action created by the law of the
foreign state as a method of furthering its own governmental interests will not be enforced.
But see comment d which excepts judgments on claims for payment for a privilege given
or service rendered by the state for a price. This exception seems broad enough to include
most forms of taxes, although made because of the principal case.
12. See Note (1933)

42 YALE L. J. 1131.

13. It is perhaps significant that the Supreme Court refused certiorariin this case. 55
Sup. Ct. 89 (1934).
14. Instant case at 200. The court stated as a practical ground for its decision that if
a claim such as this could not be prosecuted against a foreign corporation, the state would
be subject to grave wrongs, since corporations sometimes do business in a state and have no
property there against which redress may be had.
15. See Note (1912) 12 CoL. L. Rav. 6o. See also Note (1934) 3 MERCER BEASLEY L.
REV. 199, to effect that there is unanimity of authority that a tax is not a debt or a contract.
r. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1934) tit. 72, § 2301.
In re Estate of Hodges, 170 Cal. 492, 150 Pac. 344 (1915); Bemis v. Board of

2.

Aldermen, 96
3. Union
Pennsylvania,
CoNFLicTs oF

Mass. 366 (1867).
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Frick v.
268 U. S. 473 (1925) ; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928); GOODRICII,
LAws (927) § 6o.
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even that of the owner's domicil-is a taking of property without due process
and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 While the rule is exceedingly
clear and readily expounded, some difficulty arises in its application. The doctrine requires that the tangibles have an "actual situs" within the taxing state;
otherwise the state of the owner's domicil may tax.' Authorities are agreed
that for an "actual situs" mere physical presence is not sufficient; the chattel
must be located in the state "more or less permanently". 6 Whether or not the
location is of sufficient "permanence" as to give jurisdiction to tax appears to
be a mixed question of fact and law. Any solution of the problem necessarily
involves a consideration of two factors: (I) physical presence for a period of
time; (2) state of mind of the owner of the chattel. The chattel is within the
physical control of the state wherein it rests; and since physical control is sufficient to give jurisdiction over a chattel for most purposes,' it would seem
that in a close case where the state of mind of the owner is susceptible to more
than one interpretation, the emphasis should be placed on the factor of physical
presence.
In the field of direct property taxation the courts have definitely
stressed physical presence.' 0 The decision in the principal case indicates the
tendency of the United States Supreme Court to attach weight to this factor in
deciding inheritance tax questions arising between the states." From the practical consideration of ease in assessing and collecting a tax where the chattel is
located, such a tendency would appear to be justified. 12 At the same time the
absence of any hard and fast rule allows the court to find situs in another
jurisdiction if the chattel is in transit or situated for an extremely short time.
And since the tax may be constitutionally levied by one jurisdiction only, no
injustice to the owner occurs.
UNITED STATES-NATuRE OF SENATE'S POWER TO ARREST FOR CONTEMPT

-Petitioner, a witness before a Senatorial investigating committee,' was required by subpcena duces tecurn to produce certain documents. 2 After service
of the subpcena, petitioner permitted a third party to remove from his files several of the papers subject to the subpcena. These papers were subsequently
4. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
5. Semple v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 675, 205 S. W. 789 (1918); see Commonwealth
v. Clyde S. S. Co., 268 Pa. 278, 281, iO Atl. 532, 533 (192o) ; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 62.

See cases collected in 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 452.

6. Eoff v. Kennefick-Hammond Co., So Ark. 138, 96 S. W. 986 (i9o6); Griggsby
Const. Co. v. Freeman, io8 La. 435, 32 So. 399 (1902); 2 CooLEY, loc. cit. supra note 5.
See Beale, The Situs of Things (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 525, and Powell, Taxation of Things
in Transit (1920) 7 VA. L. Rxv. 167.
7. See Griggsby Const. Co. v. Freeman, IO8 La. 435, 441, 32 So. 399, 40 (19m2);

Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit (1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 497, 528.
8. A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over things within its territory.
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 98.
9. "The general principle of situs of a chattel is based upon a natural fact, its actual
position in space. Its actual position is prima facie its situs just as a man's actual residence
is prima facie his domicil." Beale, loc. sit. supra note 6.
io. Ibid.
II. The United States Supreme Court had already decided that bills and coins deposited in a vault situated in a state other than that of the owner's domicil acquired a situs
for inheritance taxation purposes at the location of the vault. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277
U. S. I (1928).

12. It is not likely that the decision in the instant case will tend to stop loans to
museums by residents of other states in view of the solidly established rule of Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (I925), which limits the power to levy an inheritance tax on
tangibles solely to the state in which they have acquired a situs.
I. The investigation was instituted for the purpose of inquiring into the awarding of
contracts for the carriage of ocean and air mail. SEN. REP. No. 1229, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess.
Ser. No. 9648 (933).
2. 78 Cong. Rec., Feb. 2, 1934, at 1876.
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placed in the hands of the committee by the party removing them. A citation
was then served on petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt of the Senate. 3 Upon petitioner's failure to appear, the Senate ordered
his arrest by the Sergeant at Arms, the respondent. Petitioner sought a writ
of habeas corpus. Held (two justices dissenting), that the petitioner should be
released from the respondent's custody, since the purpose of the arrest was
neither "the production of documents nor to compel the testimony of a witness". MacCracken v. Jurney, 72 F. (2d) 56o (App. D. C. 1934).
The power of law-making bodies of the Federal and state governments
to conduct investigations has been firmly established as an indispensable aid
to an efficient discharge of legislative duties. 4 As a necessary incident to this
fact-finding function there exists the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. In accordance with the doctrine of
the separation of the powers of the federal government, the Congressional
power to arrest a recalcitrant witness extends only so far as it is necessary,
by compelling the production of evidence, to effectuate the legislative authority
conferred by the Constitution." Although apparently consistent with prior
authority defining the limits of the Congressional right to arrest, it is questionable whether the present result was inevitable. The' act of permitting the
papers to be withdrawn could very well place a serious obstacle in the way of
investigations, regardless of their later return to the committee. To declare
that such conduct falls within Congress' power to arrest would establish a salutary check against its recurrence. Likewise, to deny the existence of the power
where papers are destroyed by the witness, 7 on the ground that its exercise thereafter was punitive and not coercive, would set a dangerous precedent. In order
to escape furnishing evidence, witnesses could put it out of their power to
comply with the process of Congress by a wilful destruction of required documents. Although such removal and destruction seems indictable under an existing federal statute," support for a holding contrary to that in the instant case
might be found in the furtherance of the legislative duties of Congress by the
additional threat of a speedier and more effective punishmentY On the other
hand, the possibility of abuse of such a power, once contempt proceedings are
permitted as a purely punitive measure, undoubtedly influenced the court's refusal to abolish existing limitations.
3. 78 Cong. Rec., Feb. 5, 1934, at 1943.
4. See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 2o4, 225-26 (U. S. 1821) ; In re Battelle, 207 Cal.
-27, 240-41, 277 Pac. 725, 730 (1929); Wilckens v. Willett, 4o* N. Y. 521, 526 (1864);
Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee (0933) 33 CoL L. REv. I,
4; Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation (1926)
40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 205-06.

5. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray 226
(Mass. I859) ; Attorney-General v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172, 171 N. E. 82 (I93O) ; see
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S.263, 292 (929) ; Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to
Punish for Contempt (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 691, 699.
6. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917); see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 2o4,
225-26, 230-31 (U. S. 1821) ; cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 1O3 U. S. 168, igo (i88o); Ex
parte Hague, 9 N. J.Misc. 89, 93, I5O Atl. 322, 324 (Ct. Errors and App. 1930) ; People

ex rel. Sabold v. Webb, 23 N. Y. St. Rep. 324, 5 N. Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
7. The instant case arose on a demurrer. The petition alleged that all the papers had
been returned to the Senate Committee before the petitioner's arrest was ordered. The
citation for petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt referred
to the "destruction and removal" of the papers. 78 Cong. Rec., Feb. 5, 1934, at 1943. The
majority opinion proceeds on the basis that all the papers had been returned to the committee The dissenting opinion assumes that some had been destroyed.
8. II STAT. 155 (1857), 2 U. S. C. A. §§ 191-94 (927).
Its constitutionality was
upheld in In re Chapman, 166 U. S.66I (1897).
9.See In re Battelle, 2o7 Cal. 227, 242, 277 Pac. 725, 731 (1929); Herwitz and Mulligan, supra note 4 at I, 6, 8.

